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D.: Automobile Registration--Owner of Automobile Leased For Compensat
CASE COMMENTS
the land.... And there is no clear authority that such a lien may
be discharged by either payment of a fixed sum or transfer of
specific property." Id. at 303.
Owing to the recency of both the Foster and Morris cases, the
question would appear settled in Virginia. However, the West
Virginia cases present a greater uncertainty.
Martin v. Martin, 33 W. Va. 695, 11 S.E. 12 (1890), held
erroneous a decree granting a wife alimony for her life. The Hale
case, in arriving at a contrary holding, made no mention of this
earlier case. Games v. Games, 111 W. Va. 327, 161 S.E. 560 (1931),
held alimony not to be an estate, nor a portion of the husband's
estate to be assigned to the wife; but merely an allowance out of
his estate. A final decree for future alimony is not a vested
property right. Eaton v. Davis, 176 Va. 330, 10 S.E.2d 893 (1940).
The word "alimony" comes from the Latin "alimonia," meaning
sustenance, and means therefore, the sustenance or support of the
wife by her divorced husband and stems from the common-law
right of the wife to support by her husband. Ibid.
The holding in the Hale case, decided in 1929, that alimony
decreed to a wife for life is payable out of the husband's estate after
his death, has been rendered doubtful by this language used in the
more recent Robinson case: "but in view of our more recent decisions on the question, we doubt whether the rule laid down in
the Goff and Hale cases should be applied as the settled law of
this State, in respect to allowing liens to accrue after the death
of a decedent against whom a decree for the payment of money in
installments has been entered." 181 W. Va. at 171, 50 S.E.2d at 461.
"To sum up the whole matter, we are of the opinion that a
decree in a divorce suit against a father, for the payment of money
for the support of his children, becomes ineffective on his death;
and that in the ordinary case, the same rule should apply to an
alimony decree to a wife, though conceding that under the rule
of Hale v. E-ale, supra, situations may arise under which the Court
would be warranted in decreeing alimony for the life of the wife."
Id. at 173. 50 S.E.2d at 462. (Italics supplied.)
G. W. S. G.
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plates for an automobile leased to a bank. P was engaged in business of leasing, without drivers, new passenger automobiles to
individuals and firms. P leased an automobile to the bank under
a lease that prohibited the bank from using it to transport property
or persons for hire. P obtained a certificate of title for the automobile and applied to D for a class "A" registration and license.
D refused on the grounds that under existing applicable statutory
provisions P was entitled to only a class "U" registration and
license. "Vehicles subject to registration ... shall be placed in the
following classes for the purposes of registration: Class A. Motor
vehicles of passenger type other than those leased or operated for
compensation; . . . Class U. Passenger motor vehicles rented
for compensation without a driver." W. VA. CODE c. 17A, art. 10,
§ 1 (Michie, 1953 Supp.). P alleged that the statute had no application to P's business because of the requirement that a class "U"
license can not be issued unless "the assessment for such vehicle
provided in section six, article six, chapter twenty-four-a of this
Code shall have been paid." Id. c. 17A, art. 10, § 5. This is an
annual assessment on all motor carriers which must be paid to the
Public Service Commission. It was P's contention that this assessment is required by law only of common and contract carriers, and
that since P is not such a carrier and does not rent to common or
contract carriers, the attempt to thus place him in such category
deprives him of his property without due process of law. D demurred on grounds that the petition showed upon its face that the
vehicle described in P's petition was a passenger motor vehicle
rented for compensation without a driver and therefore not entitled
to class "A" registration and license plates. Held, that the owner
of a motor vehicle, which is of a passenger type, and which is used
solely for private transportation, though leased to another for
compensation, is entitled to class "A" registration and license
plates. State ex rel. Schroath v. Condry, 83 S.E.2d 470 (W. Va.
1954).
The controversy was whether, in light of the requirement that
before obtaining a "U" license the applicant must have paid to the
Public Service Commission a stated fee and obtained from that
body a notice or certificate of payment for presentation to the
Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, the legislature could place the
holder of a class "U" registration and license in the category of
a common or contract carrier when, in fact, the holder was not
such carrier. Stated differently, whether, by legislative fiat, the
legislature could make the petitioners subject to regulation as a
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common or contract carrier. In coming to the conclusion that the
legislature could not do this, the court ruled that all the pertinent
statutory provisions must be read and considered in pari materia
and that when this was done the result was an unconstitutional
effort by the legislature to place the petitioners in the category of
a common or contract carrier.
The real problem in the case would seem not to be whether
a legislature by a series of acts can place the lessors of a privately
owned and privately used vehicle in the category of a common or
contract carrier, for by well settled law, it cannot do so. Hertz
Drivurself Stations v. Siggins, 359 Pa. 25, 58 A.2d 464 (1948);
Roeske v. Lamb, 39 N.M. 111, 41 P.2d 522 (1935); Michigan Public
Utilities Comm'n v. Duke, 267 U.S. 570 (1925). It does not necessarily follow from this that a state can not prescribe different
registration and license fees for motor vehicles leased for compensation without drivers than for motor vehicles used by the owners
thereof for purely private purposes. The highways of the state
are the public property of the state and their primary use is for
private purposes; the legislature may prohibit or regulate, as it
sees fit, the use for purposes of gain, which is a special and
extraordinary use. Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U.S. 251 (1930).
The issue more clearly presented in the case is whether the West
Virginia statutes dealing with the registration and licensing of
motor vehicles must be so construed as to preclude, on constitutional grounds, the owners of a passenger motor vehicle leased to
another person for compensation for the private use of such lessee,
from being issued class "U" registration and license plates. This
need not be answered in the affirmative if the sections of the statutes
defining common and contract carriers, W. VA CODE c. 24A, art. 1,
§ 2 (Michie, 1949), and requiring applicants for class "U" registration and licenses to submit to control of the Public Service
Commission, W. VA. CODE c. 17A, art. 10, § 5 (Michie, 1953 Supp.),
should be construed as not being "of the same matter" as the classification of motor vehicles for purposes of registration and licensing
in c. 17A, art. 10, § 1, supra. Why should tlhis construction be
adopted in the principal case? A firmly established rule is that,
whenever an act of the legislature can be so construed and applied
as to avoid a conflict with the constitution, and give it the force
of law, such construction will be adopted by the courts. Bennett
v. Bennett, 135 W. Va. 3, 62 S.E.2d 273 (1950); State v. C. H.
Musselman Co., 130 W. Va. 209, 59 S.E.2d 472 (1950); see Colson,
Some Elementary Principles of Constitutional Law, 53 W. VA. L.
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REv. 117 (1951). If the various statutory provisions which relate to
common and contract carriers were to be so construed as not to
apply to privately owned passenger automobiles leased for compensation for the private use of the lessee, then no constitutional
question would be raised. The only code section pertinent, in a
positive manner, to the question would be c. 17A, art. 10, § 1. It
in itself is clear and unambiguous and would certainly seem to
indicate that the legislature intended that class "A" registration
and licenses were not to be issued to owners of passenger vehicles
leased or operated for compensation, but that such vehicles were
to be placed in class "U". If the legislative intent is clear, the
courts should give the unambiguous language of a statute full
force and effect, and should not attempt to read into the provision
a meaning which is not intended. Hereford v. Meek, 132 W. Va.
373, 52 S.E.2d 740 (1949); Barnhartv. State Compensation Comm'r,
128 W. Va. 29, 35 S.E.2d 686 (1945); State v. Patachas,96 W. Va.
203, 122 S.E. 545 (1924). To carry out this intent would require
that an owner of an automobile so used pay a higher registration
and license fee than an owner using his automobile in a purely
private manner. This exercise of control is certainly within the
power of the legislature. Reeves v. Wright and Taylor, 310 Ky. 470,
220 S.W.2d 1007 (1949); Hodge Drive It Yourself v. City of Cincinnati, 284 U.S. 335 (1932). It is merely a question of classification,
seemingly a mandate by the legislature that the owner of a vehicle
used in a commercial manner for his own gain shall pay a higher fee
for such privilege than an owner whose use of his automobile is
purely personal and private. This is no more than a regulation of
the use of the public highways upon a rational and reasonable
basis and does not involve the imposition of any unconstitutional
conditions precedent to such use. Driverless Car Co. v. Armstrong,
81 Colo. 334, 14 P.2d 1098 (1932).
B. F. D.
CRUzaNAL LAw--DEFENSES-INSAN1TY-"NEvw

TEST".-D, with a

prior history of mental disorders, was indicted for housebreaking.
On plea of insanity, it was shown that D was suffering from mental
disturbance though the evidence was not conclusive as to how far
the mental condition had progressed nor as to his capacity to
distinguish right and wrong. Plea of insanity rejected and conviction followed. Held, on writ of error, that sufficient evidence
had been introduced to meet the requirement of the "some evidence rule", which rebuts the presumption of sanity and makes
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